Discrete logarithm
The discrete logarithm (DLOG) assumption is used throughout cryptography. It is implied by the CDH assumption: an adversary which can solve the DLOG problem can also solve CDH in the same group — folklore.
Assumption
Informally, the DLOG assumption concerns a cyclic group generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter and outputs a succinct description of a cyclic group where is the group set, is a generator for the group, and is the order of the group.
\begin{algorithm}
\algname{Game}
\caption{$\Game^{\text{dl}}_{\GrGen,\calA}(\secpar)$}
\begin{algorithmic}
\State $(\GG,g,p) \gets \GrGen(1^\secpar)$
\State $x \getsr [p]$
\State $X \gets g^x$
\State $\hat{x} \gets \calA(1^\secpar, \GG, g, p, X)$
\Return $[\hat{x} = x]$
\end{algorithmic}
\end{algorithm}
We say that DLOG is hard for a group generation algorithm if for all efficient
is negligible.
Related results
- CDH ⇒ DLOG
- GGM ⇒ DLOG
- In the Generic Group Model, for groups of prime order , , where is the number of queries that issues — Sho97
Attacks
- The Baby-step Giant-step is a generic attack which works in all groups and requires space and time with . Its running time , attained at , is optimal in the GGM for groups of prime order : every generic algorithm needs group operations — Sho97
- Index calculus: sub-exponential attack on DLOG in (multiplicative group of a finite field) and in the Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves of high genus. Does not apply to generic elliptic curve groups, which is why ECDLP is believed harder than DLOG in .
- Pohlig-Hellman: reduces DLOG in a group of composite order to DLOG in groups of prime order via the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Effective when is smooth; neutralized by using prime-order groups.
- Number Field Sieve (NFS): sub-exponential algorithm for DLOG in ; best known algorithm with complexity .
- Quantum: Shor’s algorithm computes discrete logarithms in in quantum polynomial time — Shor97; it extends to any group with efficient group operations on unique encodings, elliptic-curve groups included — BL95. See DLOG ⊆ BQP.
Variations
One-more Discrete Logarithm
In some works, it is important to consider adversaries
\begin{algorithm}
% oracle-split: 40
\algname{Game}
\caption{$\Game^{\text{om-dl}}_{\GrGen,\calA, \ell}(\secpar)$}
\begin{algorithmic}
\State $(\GG,g,p) \gets \GrGen(1^\secpar)$ ; $q \gets 0$
\For{$i = 1,\ldots,\ell+1$}
\State $x_i \getsr [p]$
\State $X_i \gets g^{x_i}$
\EndFor
\State $(\hat{x}_i)_{i\in [\ell+1]} \gets \calA^{\calO_{\text{dl}}}(1^\secpar, \GG, g, p, (X_i)_{i\in [\ell+1]})$
\Return $\big[q \le \ell \land \forall_{i\in [\ell+1]}~~x_i = \hat{x}_i\big]$
\end{algorithmic}
\end{algorithm}
\begin{algorithm}
\algname{Oracle}
\caption{$\calO_{\text{dl}}(Z)$}
\begin{algorithmic}
\State $q \gets q + 1$
\State $z \gets \mathrm{dlog}_g(Z)$
\Return $z$
\end{algorithmic}
\end{algorithm}
We say that OM-DL is hard for a group generation algorithm if for all efficient ,
is negligible.
Participates in
Builds on Discrete logarithm
- DLOG ⇒ Schnorr signatures
- DLOG ⇒ BLS signatures
- DLOG ⊆ BQP
- DLOG ⇒ CDH
- DLOG ⇒ Statistically hiding commitment
- DLOG ⊆ coNP
- DLOG ⊆ NP
- DLOG ⇒ PCS
- DLOG ⇒ PRG
- DLOG ⇒ Schnorr identification protocol
- DLOG ⊆ TFNP
- DLOG ⇒ Verifiable secret sharing (VSS)
Produces Discrete logarithm