No reduction from authenticated channels to Byzantine broadcast
Statement
Over authenticated point-to-point channels without setup, for no protocol is a broadcast protocol against corruptions. Interactive consistency is solvable for, and only for, — PSL80; with oral messages the Byzantine generals problem is solvable if and only if more than two-thirds of the generals are loyal — LSP82; and in the presence of faults no solution exists in a communication graph with fewer than nodes or connectivity below — FLM85. The scenario adversary only runs copies of honest parties’ code, so it is efficient, and the argument covers randomized protocols, which then fail with constant probability, whatever hardness assumption the protocol uses — standard. Hence no reduction of any kind builds Byzantine broadcast, against for every , from authenticated channels alone.
Sketch
For and , wire two copies of each party’s code into a hexagon, the two sender copies holding inputs and . Every adjacent pair of copies sees exactly what it would see in a three-party execution whose third party is corrupted and simulates the other four copies, so validity forces the receivers next to the -sender to output and those next to the -sender to output , and agreement fails for an adjacent pair of receivers in the scenario with a corrupted sender. For , each of three parties simulates a third of the parties — standard, following FLM85.
Notes
- For and , against a faulty processor of unbounded power, a randomized protocol reaches agreement with probability at most , and this is achievable — GY89.
- The bound is tight: against broadcast is achievable with perfect security (Authenticated channels ⇒ Broadcast against ) — LSP82.
- A public-key infrastructure with signatures circumvents it, giving broadcast against any (Digital signatures ⇒ Byzantine broadcast) — DS83.