No reduction from authenticated channels to UC commitment
Statement
Over authenticated point-to-point channels without setup, no bilateral, terminating protocol UC-realizes the bit-commitment functionality (UC commitment), whatever computational assumption the protocol relies on — CF01. A commitment protocol is bilateral if only the committer and the receiver take part, and terminating if, with non-negligible probability, the receiver accepts a commitment of the honest committer and outputs a receipt — CF01. The impossibility holds already against an efficient adversary that corrupts the committer or the receiver at the outset — CF01 — the static corruptions a UC commitment must withstand, so no reduction of any kind gives a UC commitment from authenticated channels.
Sketch
Let corrupt the committer at the outset and relay messages between and the receiver, while runs the honest committer on a uniform bit . The simulator must give the committed bit before the receiver outputs its receipt, without rewinding and with no setup to exploit, so it extracts from the committer’s messages alone; a corrupted receiver that runs this simulator on an honest committer’s messages then guesses before the opening with non-negligible advantage over , although until the opening gives the receiver nothing that depends on — CF01.
Notes
- The protocol must be bilateral: with third parties taking part, a majority of the participants honest, protocols that UC-realize exist in the plain model — Can01, CF01.
- A common reference string circumvents the barrier: trapdoor permutations over bit strings then give UC commitments (TDP over bit strings ⇒ UC commitment) — CF01.
- Straight-line extraction of a corrupted party’s input also rules out UC protocols for large classes of two-party functionalities over authenticated channels (no UC MPC from authenticated channels) — CKL03.