No reduction from authenticated channels to UC commitment

Unconditional · against free reductions · CF01

Statement

Over authenticated point-to-point channels without setup, no bilateral, terminating protocol UC-realizes the bit-commitment functionality (UC commitment), whatever computational assumption the protocol relies on — CF01. A commitment protocol is bilateral if only the committer and the receiver take part, and terminating if, with non-negligible probability, the receiver accepts a commitment of the honest committer and outputs a receipt — CF01. The impossibility holds already against an efficient adversary that corrupts the committer or the receiver at the outset — CF01 — the static corruptions a UC commitment must withstand, so no reduction of any kind gives a UC commitment from authenticated channels.

Sketch

Let corrupt the committer at the outset and relay messages between and the receiver, while runs the honest committer on a uniform bit . The simulator must give the committed bit before the receiver outputs its receipt, without rewinding and with no setup to exploit, so it extracts from the committer’s messages alone; a corrupted receiver that runs this simulator on an honest committer’s messages then guesses before the opening with non-negligible advantage over , although until the opening gives the receiver nothing that depends on — CF01.

Notes