Ideal cipher model
In the ideal cipher model (ICM), every party has oracle access to a uniformly random block cipher , a family of independent uniformly random permutations of , together with the inverses ; security is proved over the choice of — standard. The model of a block cipher as a family of random permutations goes back to Sha49. The random permutation model is the case : a single public uniformly random permutation of , queried as and — standard; the Even–Mansour cipher is analysed in it — EM91 (see pseudorandom-permutation). Results proved in either model record other, listed with any other idealised model the proof also uses, and a rationale naming the model, as in TDP over bit strings ⇒ Ring signatures with fixed-ring unforgeability, whose proof also uses a random oracle.
Relation to the random-oracle model
The ICM and the random-oracle model are equivalent for single-stage security games: a random oracle is indifferentiably constructible from an ideal cipher, and an ideal cipher from a random oracle by a Feistel network with enough rounds — CDMP05, HKT11. See indifferentiability for the round counts and the limits of the equivalence.
As for random oracles (CGH98), the model cannot always be instantiated: there is a blockcipher-based hash function that is secure in the ICM but insecure under every instantiation of the cipher — Bla06.
Results in the model
- Block-cipher-based hashing. The 64 compression functions of Preneel–Govaerts–Vandewalle, each one call to (with ) whose key, input and feed-forward are each one of , , or a fixed constant , are analysed in the ICM: iterated in Merkle–Damgård, the 12 that Preneel–Govaerts–Vandewalle regarded as secure and 8 more give collision-resistant hash functions, and bounds on one-wayness separate these 20; among them are Davies–Meyer , Matyas–Meyer–Oseas and Miyaguchi–Preneel , for which queries find a collision with probability — BRS02.
- Key whitening. has effective key length at least against an adversary that obtains plaintext–ciphertext pairs — KR96.
- Password-authenticated key exchange. The two-flow protocol at the core of Encrypted Key Exchange is a secure PAKE in an ideal-cipher model, assuming CDH is hard in the underlying group — BPR00.
- Ring signatures. The Rivest–Shamir–Tauman ring signature is proved with the symmetric cipher modeled as an ideal cipher and the hash function as a random oracle — RST01 (TDP over bit strings ⇒ Ring signatures with fixed-ring unforgeability).