Universal-2 HPS ⇒ CCA-secure PKE
Statement
Let be a universal-2 hash proof system for a hard subset membership problem : is smooth with functions , and is extended universal-2 with functions . The scheme with message space , , , ciphertexts for drawn by the sampler of , and , both hash values computed from the projections and the witness of , and decryption that outputs unless and and otherwise , is IND-CCA2-secure in the standard model — CS02. Both properties are meant up to the approximation of CS02, Definition 7, and the proof goes through the ideal families, at a cost of the key approximation errors — CS02. The construction uses no primitive besides the hash proof systems — CS02.
Notes
- Instances: DDH ⇒ Universal-2 HPS and DCR (safe-prime moduli) ⇒ Universal-2 HPS; composing with the DCR system gives DCR (safe-prime moduli) ⇒ CCA-secure PKE, and the Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem is a special case over the DDH language, with the input of the universal-2 component compressed by a universal one-way hash function — CS02.
- Dropping and its check leaves an IND-CPA-secure scheme: HPS ⇒ CPA-secure PKE — CS02.