[CH07] Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Proxy Re-Encryption

Authors: Ran Canetti, Susan Hohenberger | Venue: ACM CCS 2007 | Source

Abstract

In a proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme, a proxy is given special information that allows it to translate a ciphertext under one key into a ciphertext of the same message under a different key. The proxy cannot, however, learn anything about the messages encrypted under either key. PRE schemes have many practical applications, including distributed storage, email, and DRM. Previously proposed re-encryption schemes achieved only semantic security; in contrast, applications often require security against chosen ciphertext attacks. We propose a definition of security against chosen ciphertext attacks for PRE schemes, and present a scheme that satisfies the definition. Our construction is efficient and based only on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model. We also formally capture CCA security for PRE schemes via both a game-based definition and simulation-based definitions that guarantee universally composable security. We note that, simultaneously with our work, Green and Ateniese proposed a CCA-secure PRE, discussed herein.

BibTeX

@Inproceedings{CCS:CanHoh07,
  author = {Ran Canetti and Susan Hohenberger},
  title = {Chosen-ciphertext secure proxy re-encryption},
  pages = {185--194},
  editor = {Peng Ning and Sabrina {De Capitani di Vimercati} and Paul F. Syverson},
  booktitle = {ACM CCS 2007: 14th Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
  address = {Alexandria, Virginia, USA},
  month = {oct~28--31},
  publisher = {{ACM} Press},
  year = {2007},
  doi = {10.1145/1315245.1315269},
}