[CK01] Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels
Authors: Ran Canetti, Hugo Krawczyk | Venue: EUROCRYPT 2001 | Source
Abstract
We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any key-exchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels; and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of key-exchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversary-controlled links. We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two main classes of key-exchange protocols, Diffie-Hellman and key-transport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques.
Further contributions of the paper include the formalization of “secure channels” in the context of key-exchange protocols, and establishing sufficient conditions on the symmetric encryption and authentication functions to realize these channels.
BibTeX
@Inproceedings{EC:CanKra01,
author = {Ran Canetti and Hugo Krawczyk},
title = {Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels},
pages = {453--474},
editor = {Birgit Pfitzmann},
booktitle = {Advances in Cryptology -- {EUROCRYPT}~2001},
volume = {2045},
series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
address = {Innsbruck, Austria},
month = {may~6--10},
publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Germany},
year = {2001},
doi = {10.1007/3-540-44987-6_28},
}