[DH24] Lower-Bounds on Public-Key Operations in PIR

Authors: Jesko Dujmovic, Mohammad Hajiabadi | Venue: Eurocrypt 2024 | Source

Abstract

Private information retrieval (PIR) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that allows a user to fetch a database entry without revealing to the server which database entry it learns. PIR becomes non-trivial if the server communication is less than the database size. We show that building (even) very weak forms of single-server PIR protocols, without pre-processing, requires the number of public-key operations to scale linearly in the database size. This holds irrespective of the number of symmetric-key operations performed by the parties. We then use this bound to examine the related problem of communication efficient oblivious transfer (OT) extension.

Oblivious transfer is a crucial building block in secure multi-party computation (MPC). In most MPC protocols, OT invocations are the main bottleneck in terms of computation and communication. OT extension techniques allow one to minimize the number of public-key operations in MPC protocols. One drawback of all existing OT extension protocols is their communication overhead. In particular, the sender’s communication is roughly double what is information-theoretically optimal.

We show that OT extension with close to optimal sender communication is impossible, illustrating that the communication overhead is inherent. Our techniques go much further; we can show many lower bounds on communication-efficient MPC. E.g., we prove that to build high-rate string OT from generic groups, the sender needs to do linearly many group operations

BibTeX

@Inproceedings{EC:DujHaj24,
  author = {Jesko Dujmovic and Mohammad Hajiabadi},
  title = {Lower-Bounds on Public-Key Operations in {PIR}},
  pages = {65--87},
  editor = {Marc Joye and Gregor Leander},
  booktitle = {Advances in Cryptology -- {EUROCRYPT}~2024, Part~VI},
  volume = {14656},
  series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  address = {Zurich, Switzerland},
  month = {may~26--30},
  publisher = {Springer, Cham, Switzerland},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-58751-1_3},
}