[PS04] New notions of security: Achieving universal composability without trusted setup

Authors: Manoj Prabhakaran, Amit Sahai | Venue: STOC 2004 | Source

Abstract

We propose a modification to the framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [Canetti’01]. Our new notion, involves comparing the protocol executions with an ideal execution involving ideal functionalities (just as in UC-security), but allowing the environment and adversary access to some super-polynomial computational power. We argue the meaningfulness of the new notion, which in particular subsumes many of the traditional notions of security.

We generalize the Universal Composition theorem of [Canetti’01] to the new setting. Then under new computational assumptions, we realize secure multi-party computation (for static adversaries) without a common reference string or any other set-up assumptions, in the new framework. This is known to be impossible under the UC framework.

BibTeX

@Inproceedings{STOC:PraSah04,
  author = {Manoj Prabhakaran and Amit Sahai},
  title = {New notions of security: Achieving universal composability without trusted setup},
  pages = {242--251},
  editor = {L{\'a}szl{\'o} Babai},
  booktitle = {36th Annual {ACM} Symposium on Theory of Computing},
  address = {Chicago, IL, USA},
  month = {jun~13--16},
  publisher = {{ACM} Press},
  year = {2004},
  doi = {10.1145/1007352.1007394},
}