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[vAH04] Public Key Steganography

Authors: Luis von Ahn, Nicholas J. Hopper | Venue: Eurocrypt 2004 | Source

Abstract

Informally, a public-key steganography protocol allows two parties, who have never met or exchanged a secret, to send hidden messages over a public channel so that an adversary cannot even detect that these hidden messages are being sent. Unlike previous settings in which provable security has been applied to steganography, public-key steganography is information-theoretically impossible. In this work we introduce computational security conditions for public-key steganography similar to those introduced by Hopper, Langford and von Ahn for the private-key setting. We also give the first protocols for public-key steganography and steganographic key exchange that are provably secure under standard cryptographic assumptions.

Additionally, in the random oracle model, we present a protocol that is secure against adversaries that have access to a decoding oracle (the steganographic equivalent of CCA-2 adversaries).

BibTeX

@Inproceedings{EC:vAhHop04,
  author = {Luis von Ahn and Nicholas J. Hopper},
  title = {Public-Key Steganography},
  pages = {323--341},
  editor = {Christian Cachin and Jan Camenisch},
  booktitle = {Advances in Cryptology -- {EUROCRYPT}~2004},
  volume = {3027},
  series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  address = {Interlaken, Switzerland},
  month = {may~2--6},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Germany},
  year = {2004},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-24676-3_20},
}

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