Pseudorandom Function (PRF): Difference between revisions
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=== Security === | === Security === | ||
A PRF is ''secure'' if for all efficient <math>D</math>, there exists a negligible function <math>\nu</math>, such that | A PRF is ''secure'' if for all efficient <math>D</math>, there exists a negligible function <math>\nu</math>, such that | ||
<center><math> | |||
<math> | |||
\big| \Pr [D^{F_k}(1^{\lambda}) = 1: k\gets \mathsf{Gen}(1^{\lambda})] - | \big| \Pr [D^{F_k}(1^{\lambda}) = 1: k\gets \mathsf{Gen}(1^{\lambda})] - | ||
\Pr [D^{R}(1^{\lambda}) = 1 : R \gets \mathcal{F}[\mathcal{D},\mathcal{R}]] \big| \le \nu(\lambda). | \Pr [D^{R}(1^{\lambda}) = 1 : R \gets \mathcal{F}[\mathcal{D},\mathcal{R}]] \big| \le \nu(\lambda). | ||
</math> | </math></center> | ||
=== Weak Security === | === Weak Security === | ||
A PRF is ''weakly secure'' if for all efficient <math>D</math>, and all polynomials <math>s</math>, there exists a negligible function <math>\nu</math>, such that | A PRF is ''weakly secure'' if for all efficient <math>D</math>, and all polynomials <math>s</math>, there exists a negligible function <math>\nu</math>, such that | ||
<center> | |||
<math> | <math> | ||
\big| \Pr_{x_i \gets \mathcal{D}} [D((x_i,F_k(x_i))_{i\in [s(\lambda)]}) = 1] - | \big| \Pr_{x_i \gets \mathcal{D}} [D((x_i,F_k(x_i))_{i\in [s(\lambda)]}) = 1] - | ||
\Pr_{x_i \gets \mathcal{D}} [D((x_i,R(x_i))_{i\in [s(\lambda)]}) = 1] \big| \le \nu(\lambda). | \Pr_{x_i \gets \mathcal{D}} [D((x_i,R(x_i))_{i\in [s(\lambda)]}) = 1] \big| \le \nu(\lambda). | ||
</math> | </math> | ||
</center> | |||
The difference in this definition is that we sample $s(\lambda)$ inputs ''at random'' instead of allowing a distinguisher to choose them. This is strictly weaker, as a distinguisher could always query their oracle at random locations in the stronger definition. | The difference in this definition is that we sample $s(\lambda)$ inputs ''at random'' instead of allowing a distinguisher to choose them. This is strictly weaker, as a distinguisher could always query their oracle at random locations in the stronger definition. |
Revision as of 22:28, 3 July 2024
A Pseudorandom Function (PRF) is a primitive that allows someone to succinctly represent a function that is indistinguishable from a random function. A user of a PRF generates a key, which it can use to evaluate a function at many points. Any efficient adversary, who only sees these inputs and outputs of the keyed function, cannot distinguish them from a random function.
PRFs were originally defined by [GGM84] and are a basic building block for many more complex primitives such as Symmetric Encryption (SE).
Formal Definition
Syntax
A Pseudorandom Function (PRF) is a tuple of functions , with respect to a keyspace , domain , and range , such that:
- , takes a security parameter, and outputs a key ,
- , takes a key and input , and outputs an element .
Generally, we assume that is "large," in the sense that it grows exponentially with the security parameter. If instead bounded by some polynomial in the security parameter, then the primitive is a "small-domain" PRF.
Security
A PRF is secure if for all efficient , there exists a negligible function , such that
Weak Security
A PRF is weakly secure if for all efficient , and all polynomials , there exists a negligible function , such that
The difference in this definition is that we sample $s(\lambda)$ inputs at random instead of allowing a distinguisher to choose them. This is strictly weaker, as a distinguisher could always query their oracle at random locations in the stronger definition.
Relationship to other primitives
- PRGs imply the existence of PRFs, due to [GGM84] (this means that OWFs imply the existence of PRFs, in combination with [HILL99])
- PRFs imply the existence of PRPs, due to [LR88]
There are also many folklore results surrounding pseudorandom functions: