NM-CCA2 ⇔ IND-CCA2
Statement
A PKE scheme is NM-CCA2-secure if and only if it is IND-CCA2-secure — BDPR98.
Sketch
In the parallel formulation of BS99, an IND-CCA2 adversary is an NM-CCA2 adversary with an empty parallel query. Conversely, an IND-CCA2 reduction answers the parallel query of an NM-CCA2 adversary, which omits , one ciphertext at a time with its own decryption oracle.
Notes
- BDPR98 prove the equivalence for their comparison-based definition, where the direction from IND-CCA2 security is the substantive one — BDPR98.
- Without decryption queries after the challenge, NM-CPA and IND-CCA1 security are incomparable: if schemes meeting one of them exist, some scheme meets it and not the other (IND-CCA1 ⇏ NM-CPA, NM-CPA ⇏ IND-CCA1) — BDPR98.
- The scheme that DDN91 build from a perfectly correct IND-CPA-secure scheme and NIZK proofs for is NM-CCA2-secure (CPA-secure PKE + NIZK ⇒ CCA2-secure PKE) — DDN91.