NM-CPA ⇒ IND-CPA
Statement
Every NM-CPA-secure PKE scheme is IND-CPA-secure — BDPR98.
Sketch
In the parallel formulation of BS99, an IND-CPA adversary is an NM-CPA adversary whose decryption query is empty, with the same advantage.
Notes
- BDPR98 prove the implication for their comparison-based definition, and the same holds under chosen-ciphertext attacks: NM-CCA1 security implies IND-CCA1 security and NM-CCA2 security implies IND-CCA2 security (NM-CCA2 ⇔ IND-CCA2) — BDPR98.
- The converse fails for the identity map: if an IND-CCA1-secure scheme exists, some IND-CCA1-secure, hence IND-CPA-secure, scheme is not NM-CPA-secure (IND-CCA1 ⇏ NM-CPA) — BDPR98. Another construction turns every perfectly correct IND-CPA-secure scheme into an NM-CPA-secure one (IND-CPA ⇒ NM-CPA) — PSV06.